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RECENT DECISIONS
Zoning Restrictions
ParochialSchools
The constitutionality of zoning regulations which permit public schools in residential zones, but exclude private and
parochial schools, has been examined recently by the courts of two states.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in State
ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School
Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.
2d 43 (1954), upheld the constitutionality
of such a zoning ordinance against the claim
that it was unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory. The Lutheran High School
Conference sought mandamus to compel
the city building inspector to issue a permit
for construction of a private high school
within a zoning area permitting public high
schools only. The Court found that for
zoning purposes there was a reasonable and
substantial distinction between a public and
private high school, and consequently, the
regulation was valid. The distinction which
the Court held justified the restrictions in
the zoning ordinance was that the public
school serves the area without discrimination, whereas the parochial and private
schools discriminate in selecting pupils who
may attend.
A petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court has been filed by the
Lutheran High School Conference [23
U. S. Law Week 3227 (1955) 1, and to date
has not been determined. Petitioners in their
applications contend that the ordinance
permitting public schools, but prohibiting
private and parochial schools, in a residential zone is repugnant to constitutional
provisions on two theories: first, that the
ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable and

discriminatory, and thus violates the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
second, that such provisions are contrary
to the "equal protection" clause in the
Federal Constitution.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court
drew a distinction between private and
parochial schools on the one hand, and
public schools on the other, the distinction
does not relate to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare. In the absence
of such a relationship, the zoning ordinance
would seem invalid since it would be a
denial of equal protection of the laws. In
enacting zoning ordinances, the legislative
body may classify where there is a reasonable basis for the classification. Since there
is no reasonable basis in classifying schools
into public schools and private and parochial schools for zoning purposes, equal
protection of the laws is not accorded to
the private and parochial schools.
The weight of authority indicates that
regulations based on such distinctions are
not valid. Recently, a similar factual pattern was presented to a California appellate
court in Roman Catholic Welfare Corporation of San Francisco v. City of Piedmont,
278 P. 2d 943 (Cal. App. 1955). The
Court there held the ordinance invalid since
no reasonable ground was suggested for
permitting public schools, but prohibiting
all other schools teaching the same subjects
to the same age groups, in the zoned area.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker,
140 Ore. 600, 15 P. 2d 391 (1932), the
validity of a zoning ordinance which permitted the City Council discretion to refuse
permission to erect a parochial school was
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attacked. The Court, in striking down the
statute as arbitrary said, "The right to own
carries with it the right to use that property
in any manner that the owner may desire
so long as such use will not impair the
public health, peace, safety, or general welfare. The kind of school proposed to be
erected will not interfere with the public
health; it cannot affect the public peace; it
surely will not endanger the public safety;
and by all civilized peoples, an educational
institution, whose curriculum complies with
the state law, is considered an aid to the
general welfare." [Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, supra at 395].
Regulations permitting public schools
but not private schools in a residential area
have been held invalid. [City of Miami
Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750,
175 So. 537 (1937); Catholic Bishop of
Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.
2d 583 (1939); Phillips v. City of Homewood, 255 Ala. 180, 50 So. 2d 267 (1951) ].
The Florida Supreme Court, in so holding,
declared, "What objectionable characteristic touching the comfort or other general
welfare of the surrounding community may
obtain as to a private school which would
not probably obtain in greater degree as to
a public school has not been suggested,
and, we think, for the very good reason that
none exists." [City of Miami Beach v. State
ex rel. Lear, supra at 539]. The Illinois
Supreme Court cogently stated, "We fail to
perceive to what degree a Catholic school of
this type will be more detrimental or dangerous to the public health than a public
school. It is not pointed out to us just how
the pupils in attendance at the parochial
school are more likely to jeopardize the
public safety than the public school pupils.
Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the
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prospective students of the new school will
seriously undermine the general welfare. As
a matter of fact, such a school,. conducted
in accordance with the educational requirement established by State educational
authorities, is promotive of. the general
welfare." [Catholic Bishop of Chicago v.
Kingery, supra at 584].
An analogous situation is presented when
the zoning ordinance permits public and
parochial schools, but excludes private
schools, in residential areas. The Minnesota
Supreme Court found that the distinction is
not based "upon alleged evils which it is
claimed exist in the case of private and do
not exist in the case of public or parochial
schools, but is based solely on ownership."
Since the distinction bears no relation to
the purposes of the ordinance, the Court
held the ordinance invalid. [State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn.
363, 37 N.W. 2d 370 (1949)]. However,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found a
similar ordinance valid. [Yanow v. Seven
Oaks Park, Inc., 11 N. J. 341, 94 A. 2d
482 (1953); but cf. Lumpkin v. Township
Committee of Bernards Tp., 134 N. J. L.
428, 48 A. 2d 798 (1946)]. The Court in
the Yanow case, however, attempted to
distinguish the case at bar from the situation where the zoning ordinance permitted
only public schools in the zoned area, on
the ground that the exclusion of parochial
schools of like category was unreasonable.
It appears that all schools whether public,
parochial or private should be treated the
same and zoning distinctions drawn only
with respect to the types of schools (e.g.,
academic or correctional institutions.).
Houses Occupied by Religious
The definition of the term "family" contained in a zoning ordinance was the
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question before the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay,
66 N.W. 2d 627 (Wis. 1954). The village's
zoning regulations restricted particular areas
to single family dwellings. Within this restricted area, the Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette maintained a residence for
three priests and two lay brothers. The
priests aided local pastors in Milwaukee,
attended sick calls, and preached missions
in the area. The village building inspector
issued an order directing the discontinuance of the house for religious occupancy,
holding that it was not being used as a
single family dwelling. The Board of
Appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, however, held that the priests and
brothers constituted a family within the
meaning of the zoning ordinance, and
therefore could maintain the dwelling in
the restricted area.
There are several analogous cases which
arrive at the same conclusion as the Wisconsin Court in holding that a family, for
zoning purposes, is not restricted to those
living together and who are related by blood
or marriage. In Robertson v. Western
Baptist Hospital, 267 S.W. 2d 395 (Ky.
1954), it was contended that a nurses'
home in a residential area violated an
ordinance which restricted the buildings in
the area to family dwellings. The Court
found that the nurses residing in the dwelling constituted a family within the statutory definition - "one or more persons living as a single housekeeping unit, as distinguished from a group occupying a hotel,
club, fraternity or sorority house."
In Boston-Edison Protective Association
v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.
2d 847 (1943), the plaintiffs, a non-profit

organization established to ensure enforcement of restrictive covenants included in
deeds of land in a particular area, sought to
enjoin use of property in the area by the
Paulist Fathers. The deed to the property
prohibited its use for purposes other than
a single dwelling house. Plaintiffs contended
that the covenant limited occupancy of the
building to a "family," and since the priests
living there were not related by blood or
marriage, they were not a "family." In
rejecting this literal interpretation of the
covenant, the Court concluded that "it
would not be reasonable to declare the rule
to be that a restriction limiting the use of
premises to a one-family dwelling means
that the dwelling may be used only by those
who are members of a single family related
within the degrees of consanguinity or
affinity." [Boston-Edison Protective Association v. Paulist Fathers, supra at 848].
Several decisions have also held that a
restrictive covenant limiting use of the property to a single-family dwelling is not violated by using the dwelling as a convent
[Hunter Tract Improvement Co. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Nisqually,
98 Wash. 112, 167 Pac. 100 (1917); Scott
Co. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, Diocese of Oregan, 83 Ore. 97, 163 Pac. 88
(1917); cf. Board of Zoning Appeals of
City of Indianapolis v. Wheaton, 118 Ind.
App. 38, 76 N.E. 2d 597 (1948)].
No case has been found in which it was
held that a group of priests living together
did not constitute a "family" within the
meaning of zoning ordinances. The decision
of the Wisconsin Court, therefore, was in
harmony with decisional law in other jurisdictions in refusing to limit the term
"family" in the zoning ordinance to persons
related by blood or marriage.
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Bequests for Masses*
An Alabama Court recently upheld the
validity of a bequest for Masses in Robertson Banking Co. v. Hallet (Cir. Ct.,
Morengo Co., Equity No. 1188-A,
1954), refusing to follow a prior contrary
ruling of the Alabama Courts. [Festorazzi
v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 104 Ala.
327, 18 So. 394 (1894)]. Testatrix' will,
which included bequests to the Little Sisters
of the Poor and to the Bishop of Mobile to
expend in renovating and beautifying St.
Leo's Church, contained a provision which
gave two hundred dollars to St. Leo's
Catholic Church in Demopolis, Alabama,
for solemn Masses for the repose of the
soul of testatrix and her deceased husband.
The Court sustained the validity of the
bequest under two theories - that of charitable trust and that of private trust. A
bequest for Masses for a particular person
qualifies as a charitable trust since the Mass
is said not only for the benefit of the
particular person but for all mankind. The
Court also sustained the bequest as a private
trust for the benefit of such priest or priests
as receive one or more stipends for celebrating Mass for the purpose expressed by
the testatrix.
The Court is clearly correct in sustaining
the bequest as a charitable trust. However,
it is difficult to understand the holding that
the bequest constituted a private trust. As
such a trust, it would seem to be invalid
since it is not measured by lives in being
and 21 years as the time within which the
property must vest as required by the Alabama rule against perpetuities. [Ala. Code
tit. 47, §16; Crawford v. Carlisle, 206 Ala.
379, 89 So. 565 (1921)].
*This article was prepared from material supplied
by Vincent F. Kilborn, Esq., Mobile, Alabama.

It has been said that a bequest "for pious
use" means the same as a bequest for the
saying of Mass and that such bequests are
universally held to be, not individual bequests, but charitable trusts. [Minturn v.
Conception Abbey, 227 Mo. App. 1179,
61 S.W. 2d 352, 361 (1933)].
A "charity" has been defined "as a
gift to be applied, consistently with the
existing law, for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons, either by bringing their
hearts under the influence of education or
religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting
them to establish themselves for life or by
creating and maintaining public buildings
or works, or otherwise lessening the burden
of the government." [Webster v. Sughrow,
69 N.H. 380, 45 Atl. 139, 140 (1898),
citing Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14
Allen) 539, 556 (1867)]. It has been held
in Lanza v. Di Franzo, 92 N.E. 2d 299
(Ohio 1949), that a provision in a will
bequeathing the residuary of testator's
estate for Masses to be said for the repose
of his and his wife's soul was a valid charitable trust or use; and further that it is
well recognized, as a matter of judicial
notice, that there is no difference between
a Mass said for the repose of the soul of
one deceased and any other type of Mass.
In Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A. 2d 383
(1943), a bequest of $500 to the Catholic
Bishop of the City of Wilmington, Delaware, to be distributed by him at his discretion, within one year after testator's
death, among the priests of his diocese, to
have Masses said for the decedent, was
held valid as a charitable trust. This Court
defined a charitable trust as one for the
benefit of the public or some portion
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thereof and held the advancement of religion to be one of the objects of a charitable
trust. [See also Morris v. Edwards, 277
N. Y. 141,124 N.E. 724 (1918); Rhymer's
Appeal, 93 Pa. 142 (1880)]. Again, in
Sedgwick v. National Savings Bank and
Trust Co., 130 F. 2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
where the decedent left all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate and property to the Holy Name Cathedral, State
and Superior Streets, Chicago, Illinois, for
Masses for the repose of his soul, the Court,
in holding the bequest valid, observed that
a trust for saying Masses for one's soul or
the souls of others, if otherwise valid, is
valid as a charitable trust.
The following testamentary provisions
have been upheld as charitable trusts: the
setting aside of a certain sum of money so
that every year there may be celebrated two
high Masses for the suffrage of the decedent's soul [Matter of Semenza, 159
Misc. 487, 288 N. Y. Supp. 556 (Surr. Ct.
1936)1; the application, after payment of
funeral expenses, of the remainder to pay
certain expenses and to have a Mass said
annually for the souls of the decedent's
deceased wife and sister and himself [Webster v. Sughrow, supra]; the devising of
realty to a certain Church with authority
to sell it and apply the proceeds of such
sale for Masses for the repose of testator's
soul, and the souls of his deceased wife,
mother-in-law and brother-in-law. [Hoeffer
v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 49 N.E. 527
(1898)].
In a few jurisdictions, bequests for
Masses have been upheld on the ground
that they constitute a present absolute gift.
Thus, it was held in Matter of Lennon, 152
Cal. 327, 92 Pac. 870 (1907), that a
bequest of $3,500 to Bishop Conaty to

have the same amount applied to the celebration of Masses as soon as possible, was
not a charitable use in that it was not for
the benefit of the public or any class or
division of the public, it lacked the element
of continuance in perpetuity which characterizes a charitable use, and it was not for
the Bishop's benefit but for the benefit of
the testator. But the Court held the testamentary provision valid as a gift which
takes effect at once, like any other personal
bequest for a legal object. [See also Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kan. 7, 51 Pac. 883
(1898)]. Twelve years later, however, the
California Court sustained a bequest to a
Bishop for Masses on the theory of charitable trust. [Matter of Hamilton, 181 Cal.
758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919)]. The Court in
the Hamilton case pointed out that the
character of Masses, as shown by the evidence, being of benefit spiritually to all the
members of the Catholic Church as well as
those for whom it is said and those present,
would warrant the conclusion, almost as a
matter of course, that a bequest in trust
for Masses is a trust for a charitable use.
In one of the leading cases holding a
bequest for Masses valid as a charitable
bequest, the Court stated [Matter of
Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N.W. 672,
675 (1910)]:
"... the whole church profits by every
mass, since the prayers of the mass include all of the faithful, living and dead.
The sacrifice of the mass contemplates
that all mankind shall participate in its
benefits and fruit. 'The mass is the
unbloody sacrifice of the cross and the
object for which it is offered up is in the
first place, to honor and glorify God;
secondly, to thank Him for His favors;
third, to ask His blessing; fourth, to

THE CATHOLIC LAWYER

propitiate Him for the sins of all mankind. The individuals who participate in
the fruits of this mass are the person or
persons for whom the mass is offered,
all of those who assist at the mass, the
celebrant himself, and for all mankind,
within or without the fold of the church.'
So it seems clear upon reason and
authority, under the doctrine of the
Catholic Church as established by the
evidence in this case, that a bequest for
masses is a 'charitable bequest,' and
valid as such, although the repose of
the souls of particular persons be
mentioned."

Religion and Adoption Laws
In In re Duarte, 122 N.E. 2d 890 (Mass.
1954), petitioners seeking adoption of a
child were Seventh Day Adventists. They
stated that they intended to raise the child
in that faith despite the fact that he had
been baptized a Roman Catholic. In reversing a dismissal of the petition, the Court
stated: "The judge [in the lower court]
judicially noticed that 'there are pending
many applications for placements of children of the Catholic faith in homes that
can supply both the necessary physical and
spiritual requirements where this child can
be placed for adoption.' Plainly these facts
were not matters of common knowledge of
which the court could take judicial notice
and use as the basis of a conclusion that
an adoption of the child by the petitioners,
because of their different religion, was not
'practicable.' " [at page 891]. The Court
distinguished the Goldman case, supra, in
that the judge there made detailed findings
on the issue of practicability as determined
by the evidence of the case which included

testimony of persons connected with "Catholic institutions.
In Ellis v. McCoy, 124 N.E. 2d 266
(Mass. 1955), the question as to the practicability of permitting persons of a different faith to adopt a child arose on a
motion of the mother of the child to withdraw her consent to the proceeding. The
mother, who was unmarried, had signed
the petition for the child's adoption without
desiring to know the names of petitioners,
and the prospective adoptive parents had
paid the cost of her confinement. Soon
after the mother discovered that petitioners
were not of the Catholic faith, and that they
had been previously divorced, she demanded the return of her child. The petitioners, however, refused, and declared
their intention to raise the child in the
Jewish faith, contrary to the mother's
wishes. The mother, in opposition to the
petition filed for adoption of the child,
moved to withdraw her consent, and to
appoint her or some other person as
guardian of the child. The lower Court
granted the mother's motion to withdraw
her consent, and dismissed the petition for
adoption. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the order
of the lower Court, saying: "It is apparent
from the findings that the judge allowed the
motion to withdraw consent principally
because of the difference between the religious faith of the mother and that of the
petitioners. In disposing of the motion he
must have realized that its allowance would
require the dismissal of the petition for
adoption. It cannot be held that there was
error in law attaching to the religious factor
the same importance which would be
obliged to give it in passing upon the merits
of the petition." [at pages 268-269].

